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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL, 
Petitioner, Appellant, and 
Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
MERAE KIMBALL, 
Respondent, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20060263-CA 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, 
AS ISSUES APPELLANT RAISED WERE NOT CHALLENGES TO FACTUAL 
FINDINGS. 
This Court should find that because the issues raised by James Kimball 
(Appellant/Cross-Appellee) were not challenges to factual findings or challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the marshaling requirements of Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(9) does not apply, thus in Appellant's brief, he was not required to 
marshal the evidence regarding his claims. 
POINT II: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE FUNDS ACCESSED FROM THE FIDELITY 
ACCOUNT WERE USED FOR FAMILY PURPOSES. 
This Court should find that there is sufficient evidence in the record, testimonial 
evidence corroborated by physical evidence, to support the trial court's findings that "it is 
reasonable" that funds James Kimball (Appellant/Cross-Appellee) accessed from the 
Fidelity account were used for family purposes. 
1 
POINT III: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS UNDERLYING ITS RULING HOLDING 
APPELLEE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
This Court should find that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to 
support the trial court's factual findings underlying its findings of contempt on behalf of 
Merae Kimball (Appellee/Cross-Appellant), thus finding it was not clearly erroneous. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DENIED APPELLEE'S 
MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS. 
This Court should find that as there was no evidence that counsel for James 
Kimball (Appellant/Cross-Appellee) intended to mislead or misrepresent, thus the trial 
court appropriately denied Merae Kimball's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT 
THE STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT MONIES WERE NOT MARITAL 
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
This Court should find it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to fail to find 
that the Stock Purchase Agreement Monies were part of the parties' marital assets, by 
their character as a marital asset (non-inherited or co-mingled and enhanced). 
POINT VI: IN THE FIDELITY MATTER, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE APPELLANT TO SHOW HE WAS 
NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED. 
This Court should find that the trial court erred by improperly imposing a burden 
of proof on James Kimball (Appellant/Cross-Appellee) to show how certain funds in 
question were used, rather than upon Merae Kimball (Appellee/Cross-Appellant), to 
prove all elements of her unjust enrichment cause of action. 
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON APPELLEE'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM. 
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The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on Merae Kimball's 
(Appellee/Cross-Appellant) unjust enrichment claims. Appellee had not requested such 
in her Amended Complaint, nor had Appellee presented any arguments regarding such at 
time of trial in the Fidelity action. 
POINT VIII: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT ORDERING 
PAYMENT TO THE APPELLANT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
This Court should find that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny 
Appellant, James Kimball's request for attorney's fess and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
AS ISSUES APPELLANT RAISED WERE NOT CHALLENGES TO FACTUAL 
FINDINGS 
The first issue on appeal that James Kimball (Appellant/Cross-Appellee) raised 
was whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Stock Purchase 
Agreement monies were not marital property subject to equitable distribution. The 
second issue, was whether it was an abuse of discretion of the trial court to deny James' 
60(b) Motion where the drafted documents did not reflect orders of the Court. Lastly on 
appeal of the Divorce matter, James states that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
awarding him attorney's fees and costs. (See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
19800; Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
I 
P.2d 304 (Utah 1988); and Newmeyer v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987)). 
Neither the rationales in support of, nor the rule requiring marshaling the evidence 
apply to review of questions of law, questions of application of law to fact, or questions 
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within the trial court's discretion. As none of these three issues raised by James were 
factual questions or challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, therefore, the 
marshaling requirement is not applicable to the briefing of those issues. (See, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Revised, 12 Utah Bar J. 8 
(1999); and Ryan D. Tenny, the Utah Marshaling Requirement: An Overview, 17 Utah 
Bar J. 22 (2004)). 
POINT II: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE FUNDS ACCESSED FROM THE FIDELITY 
ACCOUNT WERE USED FOR FAMILY PURPOSES 
Appellant, James Kimball always had an active interest in his family, evidenced 
by playing a key role in negotiations over the purchase price of the Stock Purchase 
Agreement monies; managing the investment of the sales proceeds; and solely managing 
the parties' finances, including management of the Stock Purchase Agreement monies. 
Additionally, James played a significant role in the purchasing of personal property for 
the family such as a boat and a suburban vehicle, as well as real property, taking title as 
joint tenants in common. 
In James5 testimony during the Divorce trial, he stated it was a common practice 
of the parties to transfer funds from the Fidelity account to the joint Bank One account so 
that funds could be used in a piecemeal fashion for family expenses. (Div. Trans. 924:10; 
957:17). Such family expenses included payment of household bills and utilities, and 
maintenance of the family including recreation, groceries, tennis lessons, club 
memberships, gasoline, automobile payments, insurance payments, family trips, boating 
trips, holiday shopping, payment of loans, and payment of unexpected expenses related to 
4 
family boat and automobile accidents. As a devoted family man, trying to meet the 
demands required to provide for a family, it is clear monies withdrawn from the Fidelity 
account were for the purpose of benefiting his family. At no time has the Appellee, 
Merae offered any evidence to suggest James used these monies for any other purposes. 
POINT III: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS UNDERLYING ITS RULING HOLDING 
APPELLEE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT 
It is well established in Utah law that courts have an inherent power to punish for 
contempt and waste of judicial resources. (See Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, Yil 12-
13, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999) (internal citation omitted)). Contempt is a collateral matter 
that the courts have continuing jurisdiction over, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78B-
6-301 et seq., (recodified 2/07/08, previously §78-32-1), and is not required to be 
reserved by the parties. There is sufficient evidence on the record to support the trial 
court's finding of contempt against Merae Kimball (Appellee/Cross-Appellant). Merae 
had violated a multitude of court orders and, at the time of the Divorce trial, James was 
able to demonstrate the following: 1) That Merae knew what was required, 2) that Merae 
had the ability to comply, and 3) that Merae had intentionally failed or refused to do so. 
(See Thomas v. Thomas. 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1997)). Merae did not dispute this 
evidence or offer any rebuttal testimony. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to 
demonstrate that the trial court's findings is not against the clear weight of the evidence 
and should not be found by this court to be "clearly erroneous." 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DENIED APPELLEE'S 
MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
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This Court should sustain the trial court's denial of Merae's Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions. Merae's Request to impose Rule 11 Sanctions against James' counsel was 
based on an inadvertent mistake which James had made on a credit application at a car 
dealership. Namely, James inadvertently stated on the credit application that he made 
"$60,000.00 per month," instead of stating that he made $60,000.00 per year. There was 
no evidence presented at the time of the Rule 11 Motion, nor has there been any evidence 
presented that counsel for James intended to misrepresent or mislead with the 
representations made by James. Additionally, public policy would demand that there be 
some margin for human error allowed without punitive repercussions. Therefore, the trial 
court appropriately denied the Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions, and Appellant urges this 
Court to sustain such Ruling. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT 
THE STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT MONIES WERE NOT MARITAL 
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
"Inheritance" is defined as "property received from an ancestor under the laws of 
intestacy" and "property that a person received by bequest or devise." (See Blacks Law 
Dictionary, 628 (7th ed. Abridged)). Consistent with this definition, property has been 
considered "inheritance" by Utah courts in the division of marital assets where it was 
received by intestate succession or through the probate of a will, never as broadly as to 
include intervivos transfers. (See Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); and 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994)). After absorbing the true 
meaning of these definitions, it would be difficult to see how the Stock Purchase 
Agreement monies received could be characterized as "inheritance." Such funds resulted 
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from the sale of stock which Appellee received from her mother following her father's 
death. Appellee's mother is the only person who "inherited" anything from Appellee's 
father, pursuant to the agreed upon alteration of her father's will (Div. Trans. 77:22-25; 
78:1-25; 79:12-25; 80:1-19; Addendum 18). 
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the Stock Purchase Agreement monies did 
indeed result from inheritance, then Appellant, James Kimball asks this Court to find that 
the funds nevertheless lost their separate character as such by being co-mingled with the 
marital estate. This is clearly evidenced by the parties' practice of transferring funds 
from the Fidelity account to the joint Bank One account so that the funds could be used 
for family expenses as further identified herein. Additionally, the parties historically 
filed joint tax returns with the tax debt owing, as a result of the Stock Purchase 
Agreement monies, being paid from bank account the parties maintained jointly; and 
further, the parties had withdrawn monies from the Fidelity account to purchase their 
2248 East Lauri Kay Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, Parcel #1 property as joint tenants. 
Filing joint tax returns, purchasing vehicles, purchasing real estate, as well as funding 
family recreation, holidays and vacations is all consistent with any married couple who 
treats all marital money as an asset to the marriage. 
POINT VI: IN THE FIDELITY MATTER, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE APPELLANT TO SHOW HE WAS 
NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
This Court should find that the trial court erred by improperly imposing a burden 
of proof on James Kimball to show how certain funds in questions were used, rather than 
on Merae to prove all elements of her own unjust enrichment cause of action. Which 
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party has the burden of proof is a legal question reviewed for correctness using a 
"correction of error55 standard of review. (See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 
(Utah 1998); and A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr,. 977 P.2d 
518, 522 (Utah Ct. App, 1999)). Under Utah law, Merae had the burden to prove three 
(3) separate elements to sustain a claim of unjust enrichment as follows: 1) a benefit 
conferred on one person by another, 2) appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the 
conferee, and 3) acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value. (See Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto Inc., 2000 UT 83, \ 13 
(citing Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1994))). 
Under Utah law, James asks this court to recognize that Merae had the burden to 
prove the elements to sustain her own claim of unjust enrichment. 
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON APPELLEE'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM 
The trial court erred in awarding pre-judgment interest on Appellee, Merae 
Kimball's cause of action for unjust enrichment, in that Merae had not requested such in 
her Amended Complaint, nor had she presented any arguments at the time of the Fidelity 
trial regarding the same. James is entitled to notice of claims to be presented in order to 
defend against the same. James was not provided such notice nor reasonable opportunity 
to respond to Merae's closing arguments requesting an award of pre-judgment interest on 
the alleged "forged" or "fraudulent" checks. (Dejavue Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 
UT App. 355 ffif 24-25; Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994); 
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Shoreline Development Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992)). 
POINT VIII: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT ORDERING 
PAYMENT TO THE APPELLANT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
This Court should find that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny 
Appellant, James Kimball's request for attorney's fees and costs, especially where James 
had demonstrated respective financial need; reasonableness of fees should have only 
determined the amount of the award not resulting in a denial in entirety; and the trial 
court should not have relied upon whether the payment of fees had been advanced by a 
third party. Peterson v. Peterson, 818P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. 
Haumont 793 P.2d 421,425 (Utah App. 1990); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 
1336 (Utah App. 1988); and Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah App. 1988). 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, James Kimball respectfully requests attorney's fees and costs 
for filing this Reply on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, James Kimball respectfully requests that this Court: 1) 
Find that James was not required to marshal the evidence, as the issues he presented for 
appeal did not challenge Findings of Fact; 2) sustain the trial court's findings that the 
Stock Purchase Agreement monies from the Fidelity account were used for family 
purposes; 3) sustain the trial court's finding regarding the contempt of Appellee/Cross-
Appellant, Merae Kimball; 4) sustain the trial court's ruling that Rule 11 sanctions are 
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not appropriate in this matter; 5) find the trial court erred in characterizing the Stock 
Purchase Agreement monies as inheritance, and find that such monies are indeed part of 
the marital assets subject to equitable distribution; 6) find that the trial court erred in the 
Fidelity matter by placing the burden of proof on the Appellant, James Kimball, and 
recognize that the burden of proof should be on Appellee, Merae Kimball to prove all the 
elements of her unjust enrichment cause of action; 7) find that the trial court erred in its 
award of pre-judgment interest; and 8) overturn the denial of Appellant, James Kimball's 
attorney's fees and costs at time of trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of July, 2008. 
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C, 
Wendy J. Lems^ 
A ttorneyfor Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
James Kimball 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this e ^ y of July, 2008, a true and correct copy of the 
forgoing was sent via Hand-Delivery, to the following: 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq. 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
Merae Kimball 
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